The issues of default spillover and systemic risk should be weighted for the market participants with longer credit exposures, and for regulators with a mission to stabilize financial markets. The US banks contribute more to the long-run default spillover before 2012, whereas the European banks are major default transmitters during and after the European debt crisis either in the long-run or short-run. The outperformance of the network DNS model indicates that the prediction on CDS curve requires network information.
Introduction
Probability of default (PD) is the likelihood of a default with respect to obligations over a particular time horizon. A PD 'curve' used to map PDs with horizons typically shows an upward slope, although occasionally it may display a downward slope to signal a severe credit deterioration in the short-run relative to long-run. The PD curve varies in time and as in the analysis of term structure for CDS spreads, carries information on comovements and common factors. An extraction of common factors from cross-sectional credit default swaps (CDS) spreads allows to analyze the shape and the dynamics of the PD. To be more specific, the shape of PD curve can be parsimoniously inferred by projecting the cross-sectional CDS spreads with different maturities to a few numbers of factors. The dynamics of curves and their interplay which is casted into network topology reflecting the interdependency in a controllable dimensionality.
This study strives to analyze the term structure of CDS spreads (or CDS curves) in several aspects (1) extract the short-Term(ST), middle-Term(MT) and long-Term(LT) default factor from CDS curves; (2) quantify their comovements and identify the firms being downgraded simultaneously; (3) model the default spillover in the ST, MT and LT perspective, respectively; (4) predict the CDS curves based on the calibrated dynamics.
The initial question tagging on the above attempts is why one needs to look at the CDS spreads and its information content. Han and Zhou (2015) pointed out the various advantages of CDS over bond spreads: CDS spreads are not subject to the specification of benchmark risk-free yield curve (Longstaff et al., 2005) , less contaminated by nondefault risk components (Ericsson et al., 2009 ) and have better price discovery in credit condition (Blanco et al., 2005) . Most notably, the default intensity and recovery rate of a bond can be derived, based on a number of CDS spreads pricing models, from the market prices of CDS spreads. The CDS curve yields information on the risk-neutral default probability over different time horizons. Market participants rely on this curve to interpret the market 'expectation' of default risk in different time frames (ST, MT, LT), to manage credit risk and to design credit derivative contracts. Moreover, analogous with interest rate expectations hypothesis, the difference between current LT and ST CDS spreads can be used to predict future changes in ST CDS spreads.
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The proposal made here is to employ a factor model with shapes as in the Dynamic Nelson-Siegel (DNS) . The derived latent factors are time series with the dynamics portrayed, and can be estimated by a two-stages least square procedure or by a state space approach. The economic underpinning of the DNS model is that the three latent factors distilled from cross-sectional CDS spreads over maturities ideally represent the ST, the MT and the LT factor in terms of default. Having these extracted common factors, one can dive directly into the credit horizons of interest.
Nowadays the fear of default risk is transferring from an individual case into a systemic impact which is more likely to break down the architecture of financial interdependence.
For example, a default event of a bank can be regarded as systemic if its failure or extreme turbulence results in a directly widespread distress or indirectly triggers a contagion. This issue is of importance for financial industry due to their correlated exposure holdings or direct interbank obligations, this is the very reason in this research we focus our sample on the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). To stabilize financial markets, Financial Stability Board (FSB) strives to identify the systemic important ones and rank the financial institutions in terms of their systemic relevance. To address this issue, we develop and apply a unified framework, namely "the network topology of variance decompositions", for quantifying default spillover, contagion or interconnectedness. Given the ST, MT and LT credit factor extracted from the DNS model, it is of interest to what extent the credit condition of bank i is subject to its past credit but also the credit conditions of other banks due to interbank relationship. Will credit spillover or contagion evenly be observed in the ST or LT credit horizon or both? Can we use this information to foresee crisis and evaluate the tension embedded in the credit assets with different maturities?
It's worthwhile to relate the aforementioned issues to CDS pricing and forecast. Pricing CDS contracts is suggested to take credit spillover into account, especially for the reference entities whose default intensity is vulnerable to others. Likewise, one may produce better out-of-sample forecast performance in CDS curve with this consideration. Note that the forecast here is for an entire curve instead of a point prediction. The forecast is valuable for the counterparties in the both sides of CDS contract. For buyers, the forecast is very decisive for the timing of gauging a CDS contract to hedge credit risk at the earlier stage 3 of default likelihood. They can benefit through a relatively lower insurance payment.
For sellers, with default network information, they avoid underestimating CDS spreads.
We will demonstrate the forecast implementation in the later section. This study also contributes to the bondholders with different time horizons of credit exposures; to policy makers with policy goals setting for the ST and the LT perspective; to the portfolio managers for diversifying their bond portfolios; and to credit agencies for rating firms' credits in different time frames.
Our primary findings are:(1) G-SIBs banks have comoving credit curves with high connectedness, especially in the long-term. The US banks contribute more to the long-term default spillover before 2012, whereas the European banks are major default transmitters during and after the European debt crisis either in the long-term or short-term. (2) the time-varying total default connectedness serves as an indicator for systemic risk, especially for identifying a clustering default subsystem. The TED spread, credit spread and VIX are main determinants of default connectedness. (3) The network-based DNS model, relative to the DNS model, yields better out-of-sample prediction for CDS curves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the network-based DNS model is introduced in Section 2, model estimation is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and offers preliminary analysis. We summarize the empirical results and detail the analysis of static and dynamic connectedness measures in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Modeling framework
The beginning of this section details the procedures of modeling the CDS curves with Dynamic Nelson Siegel (DNS) framework, in which the three Nelson Siegel parameters, i.e., level, slope and curvature, can be viewed as the long, medium and short term factor of the CDS curves. Further, to tackle systemic default, credit contagion or spillover, and network connectedness of default, we utilize the Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness measures, which rely on the variance decompositions in a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In addition, the out-of-sample forecasting framework with or without other bank's information 4 are also introduced.
Fitting the CDS curve via the Dynamic Nelson Siegel model
2.1.1 A factor model representation Nelson and Siegel (1987) propose a PCA based parsimonious three factor model for modelling the cross-sectional yields at any point. Diebold and Li (2006) extend this into the DNS framework and find excellent forecasting properties for interest rates. model the yield curve via a state space factorization and find strong influences from macro variables.
Likewise, the CDS curves have a similar term structure framework so that a natural progression is an application of the CDS curves (Shaw et al., 2014; Krishnan et al., 2010) .
Define y it (τ ) as the nominal CDS spreads of financial institution i on a vector comprised of 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 20Y, 30Y ) , k = 10. The DNS factorization for a single financial institute i at time point t is,
where the disturbance vector
) . The parameter matrix α i is diagonal in transition equation. δ the constant decay factor (here δ = 0.0609). We varied the decay factors and estimated it for each bank, however it changes little on the results, therefore, for simplicity it is set to be a constant. y it (τ ) is the so-called term structure of CDS spreads or CDS curve of institution i at time t.
The three DNS parameters l it , s it , and c it can be interpreted as LT, ST, and MT latent factors. Since the factor loading on l it is 1, which is a constant and the same for all 5 maturities, l it can be viewed as the long-term or level factor. Any increase in l it will cause the entire curve to shift upwards, representing the 'level' and 'long-run' components of credit curve. The factor loading of s it is
, starting from 1 and exponentially deceasing to 0, can be viewed as the ST factor. The 'slope' of credit curve is changing accordingly. The loading of c it is
, a function which starts from 0 then increases and decays to 0, hence it is the MT factor. In sum, the shape of the credit curve is captured by these three factors. A time-varying shape is reflected by the changing loads on the three factors.
For the purpose of depicting the interplay of projected factors among banks, one has the challenge to calibrate the dynamics of l it , s it , and c it as e.g. a VAR(1) process. This motivates us to study dynamically evolving l it , s it , and c it . Ideally, the DNS model for each bank immediately forms a state-space system as expressed in (2). Motivated by PCA, we assume the level factor, the slope, and the curvature factor are orthogonal. The parameter matrix α i is diagonal in transition equation. For this state space system, we will resort to the Kalman filter estimation method. We, therefore, assume the disturbance vector υ it and ε it to be independent and both follow a normal distribution with covariance matrix Q i and Σ i respectively. By doing so, one can distill the entire CDS curves, period by period, into three dynamically evolving dimensional parameters and model their interplay characterized by a VAR(1) process.
Network topology of DNS factors
Joint default may become systemic in the moment as banks call for bailout together or even go bankrupt sequentially. The fact of correlated default and default spillover draws more attention (see Duffie et al. (2009); Duan and Miao (2015) ). Due to interbank loans and shared credit exposures, a default risk of one bank can easily spread to others. The speed and scope of spread is subject to bank's systemic importance. We introduce a network topology of variance decomposition to measure the 'credit connectedness' which quantifies the scope of 'default risk transmission'. The embedded dynamics mechanism allows us to evaluate the speed of default risk transmission. 6
Approximating model -VAR
We endow the level, the slope, and the curvature factors with a VAR(p) dynamics:
where
N is the number of banks, in our case, N = 10. The autoregression matrix A k is N × N dimensional, p denotes the lag order of VAR. If the lag order is identically equal to 1 for l it , s it , and c it , then equation (3) represents,
It is well known that the VAR model (3) (if stationary) can be written as 
Pairwise directional default connectedness
Default connectedness measures the shares of forecast error variation due to shocks arising from others. This is captured by the variance decomposition, in which the forecast error variance of variable i is decomposed into parts attributed to the remaining variables in the system. The generalized variance decomposition (GVD) (Koop et al., 1996) 
Define the pairwise directional credit connectedness from bank j to bank i as C i←j = d ij (H), and note that in general C i←j = C j←i . This leads finally to the connectedness in 
Note that a higher H horizon in a higher prediction error variance, a higher value of 
Interpreting the connectedness
Consider as an example of the first row of Table 1 , the sum of the off-diagonal d ij , j = i of bank 1 accounts for shocks attributed to other banks, while as for the first column, the sum of d i1 , j = 1 indicates the risk contribution of bank 1. Total directional connectedness from others to i is
Likewise, the total directional connectedness to others from j is
The net default connectedness i is the difference 'To' and 'From':
The total default connectedness is:
Note that there are N 'To' and 'From' net connectedness adding up to total connectedness. Economically speaking, as C increases, banks spread default risk mutually. Hence, C in (13) is a quantitative measure of default spillover or contagion in a system.
Out-of-sample forecasts
To evaluate the informativeness of the predefined network connectedness, it is of interest to compare the forecasting performance between the network-based DNS model and the conventional DNS model. Using (3) one predicts:
where β is,t , s = 1, 2, 3 denotes l it , s it , c it respectively, and can be estimated through (1) and (2).
The autoregressive process of transition equation without the influence from the latent factors of other banks, named as DNS-AR (1),
As the forecast model comparison, the transition equation in a multivariate factor framework to undertake their interaction, named as DNS-VAR(1),
where β js,t is the latent factors from other banks j, which are estimated in the initial step, such as using (1) and (2). The parameter γ 0 is , γ is and φ js are estimated by Kalman filter method. Technical details are specified in appendix.
Model Estimation
The VAR approximating model of default intensity factor connectedness has a natural state-space model representation. If we pool all the banks together, the measurement and transition equations are
, and
Meanwhile, when level, slope and curvature factors are orthogonal with autoregressive process of order one, the parameter matrix F is,
which accommodates (2), (5), (6), and (7).
We introduce a two-step estimation method that couples the DNS model with the variance decomposition technique: In the first step, we estimate the dynamic level factor l it , the slope factor s it , and the curvature factor c it for each bank i through the Kalman filter estimation of the state space model, based on equation (1) and (2); In the second step, by utilizing the network framework based on variance decomposition in Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) , we investigate the dynamics of LT, ST and MT default factors in a network perspective, based on equation (3). In order to uncover the dynamics of the network connectedness, we use a rolling window estimation for the each factors.
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We firstly discuss the information content of CDS spreads that provides the theoretical foundations for using CDS, and then perform preliminary analysis to support the motivations in the subsequent study.
Implied default intensity in CDS spreads
The basic pricing formula for CDS contracts is to achieve the payoff balance between CDS buyers and CDS sellers. Consider a CDS contract with the maturity of M years and quarterly premium payments. CDS t (M ) denotes the annualized spread at issue. L is the risk-neutral expected loss of the notional value in the event of default. We normalize the notional face value of the contract as 1. λ t denotes the risk-neutral arrival rate of a credit event, i.e., default intensity. Then, at issue, the present value of CDS-provider side and that of CDS-buyer side should be equal,
where r t is the risk free rate. Pan and Singleton (2008) assumed the s years time discount factor as δ(s) = exp − t+s t r u du , and presumed the conditional survival probability q(s)
Then (21) is transformed to
Combing (23) and (22), we can directly imply the default intensity from CDS spreads,
It is noteworthy that the explicit relationship between default intensity and CDS spreads, such as in (24), is only satisfied under certain assumptions, such as constant loss given default L, and survival probability q(s) in (22). Since implied default intensity is naturally dependent on predetermined model set-up, we thoroughly focus on CDS spreads as a direct indicator of default intensity (see Equation (24)), to get rid of the potential model misspecification risk. Besides, through CDS spreads investigation, it also permits us to perform an out-of-sample forecast and practice a convenient comparison.
CDS spreads data
We draw our attention to the CDS spreads belonging to the Top 10 of the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), i.e., N = 10, for their plenty maturities in CDS contracts. In Table 2 , the CDS spreads with maturities ranging from 6 months, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 20, 30 years are available via DataStream. These 10 banks are selected out of the thirty-four G-SIBs based on the availability of sufficient maturities of CDS.
Banks with less than the 10 maturities of CDS are excluded from the study to ensure the representative ability of latent factors. The sample period is selected from January 1st, 2008 to December 31th, 2015, at daily frequency. and they also exhibit a clear commonality to support the notion of credit comovement.
One can observe a simultaneous increase of credit curve into banks during the Eurozone debt crisis periods, which motivates us to analyse the connectedness across banks. 
Preliminary analysis of CDS spreads
In summary, there are 26 free parameters to be estimated: the 3 × 3 transition matrix of the three state variables containing 9 free parameters, the mean state variables containing 3 free parameters, the 1 decay parameter in measurement equation, the diagonal of disturbance covariance matrix of transition equation containing 10 free parameters with each covariance for the counterpart of 10 maturities of CDS spreads, and the 3 free parameters constituting from the diagonal of measurement disturbance covariance matrix with each for one of the 3 latent variables.
We use the Kalman filter to derive the state variables and CDS spreads of next stage, after which we proceed to evaluate the unknown parameters with the maximum likelihood estimation under Gaussian distribution assumptions for the disturbance of measurement and transition equations. The initial parameter values are obtained by using the Diebold-Li two-step ordinary least squares regression and the startup value for the decay parameter is 0.0609. The estimated decay parameters are varying across banks. 
Empirical results
To characterize the evolution of the default risk connectedness among the US and European banks, we proceed to a four steps analysis: we firstly perform a full-sample analysis separately for level, slope, and curvature factor, to assess the unconditional or average connectedness. After this static connectedness analysis, a rolling-window sample analysis is conducted for the three factors respectively, to portray the dynamics of conditional connectedness. By doing so, one can monitor the dynamics of spillover effect between the US and European banks over time. Using the total connectedness in the rolling-sample framework as an indicator of systematic default risk, we analyse the sources of the systematic risk. Finally, having the predefined connectedness among bank default risk, we report the forecasting performance when incorporating the factors from other banks.
Network: static
Systemic risk is not easy to define, but the universally accepted characteristics are that it has large impact; is widespread, and has a ripple effect that endangers the financial system. Network analysis enables us to cover three major concepts of systemic risk by portraying the interplay among financial institutions, measuring their interconnectedness and quantifying the spillover effect.
Interconnectedness of financial institutions on the interbank market is an absolute key to understanding systemic risk. Interconnectedness captures the situations when financial distress in one institution subsequently raises the likelihood of financial distress in other institutions because of their network of contractual relations and interbank lending among them, leading to a 'too-interconnected-to-fail' situation. The resulting connectedness parameters like C from (13), therefore, can be used to monitor systemic vulnerability.
In the following analysis, we examine the interconnectedness and spillover with respect to the default factors in the ST, MT and LT perspective. This effort can help to answer the questions e.g. Will credit spillover or contagion evenly be observed in the short-term and long-term credit horizon? Can we use this information to foresee crisis and evaluate the tension embedded in the credit assets with different maturities? 
Level factor
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Let us discuss some of the features of the long-term connectedness table in more detail.
The highest observed pairwise connectedness is from C to GS (C GS←C = 18.54%), while in return, the pairwise connectedness from GS to C (C C←GS ) is slightly small 14.13%.
The next highest pairwise connectedness is from C to JPM (C JP M ←C = 17.73%), which is slightly higher than the pairwise connectedness from BAC to JPM (BAC JP M ←C = 17.42%). The bank C has the largest market capitalization before the 2008 financial crisis periods, it is reasonable that the total connectedness to others are largest. The bank with bigger market capitalization is more capable of offering interbank loans to other banks, it is so-called 'too big to fail'. On the other hand, the long-term pairwise directional connectedness among European banks is relatively smaller (less than 10%), except a few relatively large measures from DB to BCS (C BCS←DB = 12.97%), and from DB to CBG (C CBG←DB = 12.29%).
The 'From' column is the row sum of the pairwise connectedness except the own-effects (diagonal elements of the matrix). It reveals the total directional connectedness from others to each of the ten banks. In other words, it captures the contribution of credit shocks resulting from other banks to the total variance of the forecast error of bank i.
While the total directional connectedness is distributed tightly, the 'From' effects of US banks appear consistently smaller than that of the European banks, showing that the US banks are less impacted by the EU credit shocks.
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The column sum of pairwise connectedness quantify the spillover effect of bank i to others.
By definition, each bank's share in the forecast error variance of others is not compulsorily to add up to 1, therefore, elements in the 'To' row can exceed 100%. 'To' effect varies over banks, ranging from 126% to 46%. The largest commercial banks (as of 2008) were the ones that have the highest values of connectedness to others. C generated the largest default transmission, 126%, to others. This is consistent with the findings in Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) , which is based on the volatility of stock returns among US financial institutes. Besides, the five US banks all generate significant (exceeding 100%) long-term default risk spillover to others, compared with European banks, which evidently imply the transmission of long-term default risk shocks from the US financial institutions to the European counterparts.
Further, the strong spillover effects between the connectedness of US and European banks are clearly observed in their 'Net' row. The difference between the total directional connectedness to others and the total directional from others results in the net total directional connectedness to others. C leads the highest net total directional connectedness (44.39%), followed by BAC (40.42%), with other positive effects of US banks. By contrast, the values of net total directional connectedness in European banks are significantly negative, indicating that the contributions of European banks shock to other banks' forecast error variance are generally trivial in term of the long run default risk.
Slope factor
The short-term connectedness is shown in DDINetwork_network_static followed by DB, both were seriously hit especially during the European debt crisis. Consistently, in terms of 'Net' connectedness measures, HBC leads the head, 74.67%, while the next highest is from DB. Besides the positive values of BAC and C, the negative values are generated from other banks. In the end, the total connectedness is 79.72%, which is slightly smaller than 85.50% derived in the long-term total connectedness. 
Curvature factor
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The middle term directional connectedness is summarized in Table 6 . The total connect-edness, 62.94%, is obviously smaller than the short term and long term connectedness. In terms of the pairwise directional connectedness, the values vary more widely, such as the highest observed connectedness measure is from HBC to WFC (C W F C←HBC = 33.18%) while in the return, the lowest one from WFC to HBC (C HBC←W F C = 0.09%) is nearly zero. The spillover effect in this case is obviously 'asymmetric'. In the case of DB, one can find its spillover power in the MT or ST, but not in LT (see Table 4 ). The default tensions emphasizing on ST and MT imply that DB may hold more short-run risky loans which endangers its short-run credit. Interestingly, the 'Net' directional connectednesses are uniformly positive among European banks compared with the consistent negative ones in the US.
In a nutshell, the three DNS factors and their connectedness convey information w.r.t the default risk at the particular credit horizons. For the bank like DB, the potential to have credit deterioration and subsequently create spillover to others is more likely to happen in the short term. However, in the longer term the credit condition becomes resilient and has constrictive transmission as shown through a reverse spillover in its level factor.
Network: dynamics
The DNS model coupled with a topological network can be seen as a means of monitoring systemic vulnerability. On the supervisory purpose, the updated assessment is even more demanded. For this purpose, one studies the dynamics of connectedness in which credit contagion can therefore be identified in time. Accordingly, they will be asked by
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
for additional loss absorption capacities to ensure the sufficiency of their common equities in case of the default.
Time-varying total connectedness
Figure 3 presents time-varying connectedness, C t , estimated via C from (13) in penalties to settle claims also reported, which turned out to formally announced in August. After these blows, in April, BAC disclosed an significant accounting error of $4 billion capital loss undetected for several years. The capital error weighed heavily on the bank shares, which felled by more than 6% on that trading day, wiping out $10 billion in market value, far more than the actual losses. This indicated the collapse of trust from investors, which simultaneously triggered large shocks to other financial institutions.
Time-varying risk contribution
Graphical representation
The network dynamics may be displayed graphically, where the node size and node color are designed to capture the 'To' effect. Meanwhile, directional edge thickness indicates the strength of pairwise directional connectedness, while edge color does not vary with edge weight. Consider 3 snapshots for 2008, 2011 and 2012 in Figure 7 .
In 2008, the node size of US banks is apparently larger than that of EU banks, indicating a credit spillover from the US. Besides, the thickness of edge weights implies that the spillover effects are not only closely intertwined among US banks but also transmitted to EU banks (e.g. from GS to DB or CBG, from BAC to CBG). This evidence did not yet fade away at the end of 2011 where BAC, JPM, and C are still sizable. However, the node sizes of European banks at the end of 2011 tend to enlarge compared with that in 2008, owning to the continuous negative impact from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal debt crisis. As the European sovereign debt crisis was in its peak at the end of 2012, the European banks turns out to be enormously large, especially for the banks with big market capitalization, such as DB, CBG, and BCS. Further, the edge thickness indicates that the default risk shocks are mutually conducted not only among European banks, but also substantially outflowed from EU banks to US Banks.
The network between US and European banks
In order to have a clear picture on the cross-region spillover effects, we look at two groups, the US v.s. the EU banks, and analyse the dynamics of their default risk transmission. 
The drivers of default connectedness
Having the dynamics of default connectedness in a system, we dive deeper to investigate the determinants of this dynamics. In order to understand the evolution of systemic default risk in banking industry and control it further, the policy makers may rely on the model-implied indicators for monitoring the frailty of default in a system. In our analysis, the total connectedness can be viewed as an overall measure of system default risk, in which a high value implies widespread default risk. Hence, in this part, we take the total connectedness derived from level factor, slope factor, and curvature factor in section 5.2.1 as a measure of long term, short term, and middle term systemic default risk respectively, and opt for a vector of state variables to analyse what drive the systematic default risk.
We estimate the following regression on the basis of daily data for the determinants of the connectedness of credit curves:
where C ω,t denotes total connectedness of level factor, slope factor, and curvature factor at time t respectively, ω = {l, s, c}. M t−1 denotes state variables at time t − 1. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) propose to use the following macro published variables, e.g. (1) The change in the three-month yield; (2) The change in the slope of the yield curve, measured by the spread between the composite long-term bond yield and the three-month bill rate; (3) A short-term TED spread, defined as the difference between the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month secondary market Treasury bill rate.
This spread measures short-term funding liquidity risk. (4) The change in the credit spread between Moody's Baa-rated bonds and the ten-year Treasury rate; (5) The daily market return computed from the S&P500; (6) The daily real estate sector return in excess of the market financial sector return; (7) VIX; In addition we employ common principal components (CPC) the average variance explained by the first principle component through the common principle component approach (CPCA), see (Flury, 1984; Fengler et al., 2003; Chen and Härdle, 2015) . The CPC factor here is used to capture a common factor which may not be directly observed.
Estimating PCs simultaneously in different groups (banks) can result in a joint dimension reduction transformation, as well as yielding a joint eigenstructure across groups (banks).
The basic assumption of CPCA is that the space spanned by the eigenvectors is identical across several groups (banks), whereas variances associated with the components are allowed to vary. The CPCA essentially tests whether the principal components for different banks are the same across different maturities. More formally, for the covariance matrix across K different maturities of bank i, Ψ i , the hypothesis of CPCA is:
where Table 6 provides summary statistics of the total connectedness and state variables. In line with the previous results in section 5.1, the mean value of total connectedness of level factor is larger than that of slope factor, followed by that of curvature factor. The negative skewness values as well as kurtosis values nearly 3 indicate that total connectedness measures seem following right-skewed asymmetric normal distribution. As for CPC first factor variance explained variable, the range is roughly 13% -92%, reasonable with large deviation of 15%.
After standardizing all the variables in Table 7 , we obtain the estimated parameters through (25) in Table 8 . In column 'NW' and column 'HH', the values in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, present t-statistics based on Newey-West 32 standard errors (Newey et al., 1987) , and Hansen-Hodrick standard errors (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980) respectively, both with 5 periods of lag. Besides, the last line reports the adjusted R 2 value of the model.
33
In Table 8 , higher VIX, higher TED spread, higher credit spread, and lower market return result in high long term default risk. The short-run connectedness is driven by the TED spread and credit spread, while the medium-run one is sensitive to the TED spread and VIX. The CPC factor used to capture the latent common factor is significant across the LT, MT and ST connectedness, implying the existing latent determinants need to be discovered more. Overall, the average significance of the conditioning variables reported in Table 8 show that the state variables do indeed proxy for the time variation in the total connectedness and particularly in the long-term one.
Out-of-sample forecasts
To validate the necessity to incorporate the network information while estimating the Through overall summarizing the performance of European banks and US banks, we present the average value of RMSE difference under these two models in Table 9 . It reveals a similar pattern to what has been discovered in Figure 9 . More interestingly, the more frequent negative values shown in the EU group implies that the network information advantage in forecasting CDS curve seems to be supported more in the EU area. Predicting the CDS curve in EU banks one has to opt for a network-perspective 
The null hypothesis of equal performance is that H 0 : µ = 0. We focus on the t-statistics of parameter µ, denoted as DM t-stat, which supports the network DNS model if it is significantly negative (significance level marked by asterisks). Regardless the forecast horizons, we find the negative DM t-stat are prevalent for the maturities less than 10Y lying on the CDS curves. In other words, the network DNS model is superior than the DNS model in out-of-sample forecast, especially for the EU CDS curves. 
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Systemic risk, the risk of disruption to financial services, can be teased out directly through an investigation tagging to CDS curves, in comparison with the conventional market-based approach by using stock returns as alternatives such as the CoVaR measure.
This study shows the information content of a CDS curve for its term structure implication corresponding to particular credit horizons. The changing shape of credit curve implies the credit deterioration over different time frames (ST, MT or LT), which can be used to manage the credit exposures with different maturities.
The existant literature has paid insufficient attention on the shape of CDS curve, the dynamics of CDS curve and the comovement or interplay between curves. We contribute to the existing literature by (1) using the DNS model to extract the ST, the MT and the LT default factor from a CDS curve; (2) quantifying the comovement of CDS curves through a total connectedness measure to reflect the firms being downgraded simultaneously; (3) measuring the default spillover in the ST, MT and LT perspective, respectively; (4) conducting out-of-sample prediction for CDS curves based on the network-based DNS model.
The evidence from G-SIBs banks shows that the CDS curves comove tightly with higher connectedness, especially in the long-run. The US banks contribute more to the long-run default spillover before 2012, whereas the European banks are major default transmitters during and after the European debt crisis either in the long-run or short-run. The timevarying default connectedness and spillover can be viewed as an indicator for monitoring systemic default risk, especially for identifying the trouble makers triggering a clustered default in a system. We find that the TED spread, credit spread and VIX are main determinants of default connectedness. The outperformance of the network DNS model indicates that the prediction on CDS curve requires network information.
CDS spreads
Common principal component analysis (CPCA)
Here we introduce the maximum likelihood estimation procedures of CPC under the hypothesis in (26). The theoretical proof and the asymptotic properties of the estimates are referred to Flury (1984) and Flury and Gautschi (1986) .
Let S i be the (unbiased) sample covariance matrix of an underlying K-variate normal distribution N K (µ, Ψ i ) with sample size n i . Then n i S i follows a Wishart distribution with degrees of freedom n i − 1, Härdle and Simar (2015) 
where C is a constant not depending on the parameters Ψ i . Maximizing the likelihood is equivalent to minimizing the function
Assuming that H CP C in Equation (26) holds, replacing Ψ i by ΓΛ i Γ , yields,
We impose the orthogonal constraints in Γ by using the Lagrange multipliers µ j for the K constraints γ j γ j = 1, and using the multipliers µ hj for the remaining K(K − 1)/2 41 Taking partial derivatives with respect to all λ im and γ m , the solution of the CPC model is given by the generalized system of characteristic equations, Flury (1984) 
This is solved using 
Flury (1984) proves existence and uniqueness of the maximum of the likelihood function, and Flury and Gautschi (1986) provide a numerical algorithm.
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